





A business firm’s capital is expected to serve a
variety of purposes. In the case of a bank, capital
helps establish a level of confidence sufficient to
attract enough deposits to fund its operations. Fur-
ther, capital serves as a cushion to absorb unfore-
seen losses so that the bank can continue in business.
Agreement on what constitutes sufficient capital,
however, is not always easy to reach. In fact, from
the earliest attempts to measure capital adequacy
bankers and regulators have disputed what constitutes
“capital” and what is “adequate.”
Until World War II, the Federal bank regulatory
agencies
1 measured capital adequacy as a percent
of total deposits or assets. Prior to the great depres-
sion of the 1930s, the capital-to-deposit ratio was
used. This ratio measured bank liquidity. During the
depression the emphasis shifted to measures of
solvency, centered around the capital-to-asset ratio.
During the last two decades banks have ex-
panded into new activities. There have also been
inroads by nonregulated, nonbank financial institu-
tions into traditional banking activities and in-
creased “globalization” of banking and finance. These
developments have made the proper measurement
of capital adequacy an urgent matter.
In late 1987, the Basle Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices, composed of
representatives of the central banks of major indus-
trialized countries under the aegis of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), developed a risk-
based framework for measuring capital adequacy.
The Committee’s objective was to strengthen the
international banking systems and to reduce com-
petitive inequalities arising from differences in capital
requirements across nations.
During World War II bank assets expanded rapidly,
primarily as a result of investments in U.S. govern-
ment bonds. The Federal Reserve, in seeking a way
to avoid penalizing banks for investing in these low-
yield and “riskless” assets, devised a new ratio of
capital to risk assets. For this purpose, risk assets
were defined as total assets excluding cash, balances
due from other banks, and U.S. government
securities. Initially, a 20 percent standard for this ratio
was established as “sufficient” capital. Thus, begin-
ning in the mid-1940s the concept of capital adequacy
became associated with the risks inherent in the
earning-asset portfolio.
In 1952 the Federal Reserve adopted an adjusted
risk asset approach to measuring capital. All assets
were categorized according to risk with separate
capital requirements assigned to each category. The
minimum total capital required was the sum of the
capital requirements of each category. Banks that ex-
ceeded this minimum by 25 percent rarely had their
level of capital questioned.
This article sketches the historical evolution of
attempts to measure capital adequacy leading to the
Basle accord. It also reviews how capital measures
of U.S. banks would change under the risk-based
framework and how the new guidelines would affect
the larger banking organizations headquartered in the
Fifth Federal Reserve District.
In 1956 the Fed further refined its capital stan-
dard by coupling the adjusted risk asset approach with
a liquidity test. The FDIC and OCC followed the
lead of the Fed and also adopted this principal for
measuring capital. This test required more capital
from less liquid banks. It also considered some off-
balance sheet items. The new standard assigned dif-
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1 The three Federal regulatory agencies having responsibility
for commercial banks are the Federal Reserve System (Fed),
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
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of assets and liabilities. These percentages were
used to derive the total amount of capital needed to
protect the bank from losses on investments and from
reductions in deposits and other liabilities. A ratio
of actual capital to required capital was calculated and
if the ratio was less than 80 percent, a bank was
generally considered undercapitalized.
In 1962 the Comptroller of the Currency aban-
doned the risk assets standard on the grounds that
it was arbitrary and did not consider factors such as
management, liquidity, asset quality, or earnings
trends. Moreover, the Fed, FDIC, and OCC
disagreed over what constituted capital. The Fed
continued to define capital as equity plus reserves
for loan losses. In contrast, the FDIC and OCC
allowed some forms of debt to count as capital. Thus,
in the early 1960s regulatory opinion on capital ade-
quacy became divided. The FDIC relied on a capital
to average total asset ratio excluding fixed and
substandard assets. The Federal Reserve continued
to use risk assets as the denominator in its capital
ratios although it frequently revised its definition of
risk assets. For the remainder of the 1960s and ‘70s,
the Federal bank regulators continued to use different
definitions of capital and methods of measuring capital
adequacy.
In 1972 the Fed capital standard was revised again.
Asset risk was separated into “credit risk” and “market
risk” components. In addition, banks were required
to maintain a higher capital ratio to meet the test of
capital sufficiency. Further, the Fed reintroduced
both the capital to total asset and capital to total
deposit ratios. This time, however, the former ratio
was based on total assets less cash plus U.S. govern-
ment securities, a rough “risk asset” adjustment. In
practice, bankers and analysts used the FDIC and
Fed standards more than those of the OCC.
None of the agencies established a firm minimum
capital ratio. Instead, the capital positions of bank-
ing institutions were evaluated on an individual bank
basis. Particular attention was directed toward smaller
banks whose loan portfolios were not as diversified
and whose shareholders were fewer in number than
those of larger institutions. It was reasoned that small
or “community banks” might have a hard time rais-
ing capital in times of difficulty and therefore should
be more highly capitalized at the start than larger in-
stitutions. Table 1 shows the banking industry’s
capital-asset ratios from 1960 to 1980. The table
shows that there was a steady downward drift in the
ratio, which can be explained by a number of fac-
tors. Chief among these would be the attractiveness
of increased leverage in banking and reliance on other
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techniques to manage balance sheets, e.g., liability
management.
In late 1981 the three Federal bank regulatory
agencies announced a new coordinated policy related
to bank capital. The policy established a new defini-
tion of bank capital and set guidelines to be used in
evaluating capital adequacy. The new definition of
bank capital included two components: primary and
secondary capital.
Primary capital consisted of common stock,
perpetual preferred stock, surplus, undivided profits,
mandatory convertible instruments (debt that must
be convertible into stock or repaid with proceeds
from the sale of equity), reserves for loan losses, and
other capital reserves. These items were treated as
permanent forms of capital because they were not
subject to redemption or retirement. Secondary
capital consisted of nonpermanent forms of equity
such as limited-life or redeemable preferred stock and
bank subordinated debt. These items were deemed
nonpermanent since they were subject to redemp-
tion or retirement.
In addition to the new definition of capital, the
agencies also set a minimum acceptable level for
primary capital and established three zones for classi-
fying institutions according to the adequacy of their
total capital. As shown in Table II, different stan-
dards were applied to “regional” and “community”
Table II




1 Above 6.5% Above 7%
2 5.5% to 6.5% 6% to 7%
3 Below 5.5% Below 6%
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excluded from the measurement system altogether.
Multinational organizations were defined as those
with consolidated assets above $15 billion. There
were seventeen such organizations in 1981. Regionals
were defined as organizations with assets from $1-$15
billion while community organizations included all
companies under $1 billion.
The Fed and OCC established minimum ratios of
primary capital to total assets of 5 percent and 6 per-
cent for the regional and community organizations,
respectively. If an institution’s primary capital ex-
ceeded the minimum and total capital was in
Zone 1, its capital was assumed to be adequate. For
organizations with capital ratios in Zone 2, other fac-
tors such as asset quality and the level and quality
of earnings entered the determination of capital
adequacy.
The FDIC’s capital adequacy guidelines set a 5
percent minimum for the equity capital ratio, de-
fined as capital minus 100 percent of assets classified
as loss and 50 percent of assets classified as doubt-
ful at the most recent examination. In addition, the
FDIC excluded limited-life preferred stock or sub-
ordinated debt from its definition of capital. These
items must be repaid and-unlike true capital, they
are not available to absorb losses.
In 1983 the Fed amended its guidelines to set a
minimum capital ratio of 5 percent for multinational
organizations. It also expanded the definition of
secondary capital to include unsecured long-term debt
of holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries.
In 1985 the Fed guidelines were amended once again
when the uniform minimum primary capital ratio was
set at 5.5 percent and uniform total capital at 6 per-
cent. In addition, new zones for measuring the ade-
quacy of total capital were adopted, namely, greater
than 7 percent, 6 to 7 percent, and less than 6
percent.
In reaction to the use of a simple capital-to-asset
ratio, banks began to adjust their portfolios increas-
ing the share of higher yielding assets but requiring
no more capital than lower yielding assets. In par-
ticular, some banks switched from short-term, low-
yield, liquid assets to higher yielding but riskier assets
(i.e., loans). Also, since the capital requirements only
applied to assets carried on the balance sheet, banks
began to expand off-balance sheet activities rapidly.
Some institutions attained their ratios by packaging
assets and selling them to investors, reducing their
risk in the process.
While the ratio of capital to total assets served as
a useful tool for assessing capital adequacy for a time,
it became increasingly apparent that the type of risks
being assumed  by banks required a new approach
to measuring capital. Accordingly, in February 1986,
the Fed proposed standards for measuring capital
on a risk-adjusted basis. The proposal, followed
shortly by a similar proposal from the OCC, was
designed to: 1) address the rapid expansion of off-
balance sheet exposure; 2) reduce incentives to
substitute higher-risk for lower-risk liquid assets; and
3) move U.S. capital policies more closely into line
with those of other industrialized countries.
Under the Fed proposal, assets and certain off-
balance sheet items were assigned to one of four
broad risk categories and weighted by their relative
riskiness. The sum of the weighted asset values
served as the risk asset total against which primary
capital was to be compared. The resulting ratio was
to be used together with the existing primary and
total capital-to-total asset ratios in determining capital
adequacy.
Before the 1986 proposal could be put into effect,
however, the U.S. bank regulators requested public
comment on a revised risk-based capital framework
for banks and bank holding companies. This pro-
posal, announced in January 1987, was developed
jointly  by U.S. and Bank of England authorities.
During the comment period on the revised proposal,
the U.S. bank regulators continued to seek interna-
tional agreement on the proposal, an effort that led
in December 1987 to still another framework for risk-
based capital that had been developed jointly with
representatives from 11 other leading industrial coun-
tries.
2 This proposal has undergone continued
refinement and final guidelines were adopted officially
in December 1988.
The Risk-Based Capital Framework
The risk-based capital (RBC) framework, which
was adopted as an international standard addresses
primarily credit risk. It has four broad elements as
follows:
1. A common international definition of capital.
Core or Tier 1 capital consists of permanent
shareholders’ equity. Supplemental or Tier 2
capital is a “menu” of internationally accepted
non-common equity items to add to core
capital. Each country has some latitude as to
what supplemental components will qualify as
capital.
2. Assigning one of four risk weights (0, 20, 50,
and 100 percent) to assets and off-balance sheet
2 Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Switzerland, and
Luxembourg.
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relative credit risk. These categories are used
to calculate a risk-based capital ratio. Off-
balance sheet items are also assigned a credit
conversion factor that is applied before the
risk weight.
3
3. A schedule for achieving a minimum 7.25
percent risk-based capital ratio by the end
of 1990 (3.625 percent from Tier 1 items)
and 8 percent by the end of 1992 (4 percent
from Tier 1 items).
4. A phase-in period, from 1990 to 1992, during
which banking organizations can include some
supplemental capital items in Tier 1 capital
on a temporary basis.
The RBC framework focuses on credit risk only.
As such, the proposal does not take into account
other factors that affect an organization’s financial con-
dition, such as liquidity and funding. Also over-
looked are factors such as interest rate risk, concen-
trations of investments and loans, quality and level
of earnings, problem and classified assets, and quality
of management. These factors must also be con-
sidered in measuring financial strength and they will
continue to be assessed through the examination pro-
cess. Further, the Fed Board of Governors has in-
dicated that it may consider incorporating interest
rate risk before the new RBC takes effect.
Risk-based and traditional capital policies  The
international risk-based capital standard differs in
some respects from all the previous risk-based capital
proposals made by U.S. regulators. It reflects changes
suggested by banking supervisors in foreign coun-
tries and comments received from the public. An
important aspect of the implementation of the RBC
standard in the United States is that it will apply to
all banks, not just international banks as required by
the Basle accord. Further, the Fed has determined
that a risk-based ratio similar to the risk-based capital
framework for banks will be applied to bank holding
companies on a consolidated basis. The difference
in the capital framework for banks and the framework
for bank holding companies rests with a slightly
broader definition of capital for bank holding com-
panies. The following is a brief review of the prin-
cipal differences between the RBC framework and
3 Each balance sheet item is multiplied by the appropriate risk
weight to arrive at the credit equivalent amount. For example,
cash is assigned a zero weight. Similarly, off-balance sheet items
would be multiplied by a credit conversion factor and then by
the appropriate risk factor. For example, a long-term loan com-
mitment to a private corporation has a conversion factor of 50
percent and a risk category of 100 percent.
traditional capital guidelines that have been used in
the United States.
Core and supplemental capital components The RBC
standard like the 1987 U.S./U.K. proposal, divides
capital into two components: core capital (Tier 1)
and supplemental capital (Tier 2). After an initial
phase-in period, core capital will consist entirely of
permanent shareholders’ equity, which is defined in
Table III. This is in contrast to the current defini-
tion used by U. S. banking regulators which includes
both common and perpetual preferred stock, man-
datory convertible debt instruments, and allow-
ance for loan and lease losses. While mandatory con-
vertible debt instruments may be included in core
capital to a limited degree during the phase-in period,
after 1992 these components can be used only as
supplemental capital.
In the case of bank holding companies, both
cumulative and noncumulative perpetual preferred
stock are included in core capital. The aggregate
amount of perpetual preferred stock included can-
not exceed 25 percent of core capital, however.
Perpetual preferred stock in excess of this percen-
tage can be included in Tier 2 without limit.
4 By
allowing bank holding companies to include some
cumulative perpetual preferred stock in core capital,
the Fed is giving bank holding companies more flex-
ibility in raising capital while recognizing the value
of perpetual preferred stock in the holding companies’
capital structure. At the same time, the limits on the
maximum amount of preferred stock included in
Tier 1 are meant to protect the integrity of a holding
company’s common equity capital base.
The Fed also may designate certain subsidiaries
whose capital and assets may be excluded from capital
requirements. Securities affiliates of bank holding
companies fall into this category. However, to be ex-
cluded the Fed has specified that strong barriers be-
tween affiliates, adequate capitalization of nonbank
subsidiaries, and any other protections that it deems
necessary must first be in place to safeguard the
health of affiliated banks.
Table IV shows the results of applying the con-
cept of RBC core capital to the 35 largest banking
organizations in the Fifth District, i.e., those organi-
zations with total assets greater than $500 million
as of mid-1988. The calculations are estimates
only, inasmuch as the information necessary for
4 “Dutch Auction” preferred stocks are those types of pre-
ferred stock (including remarketable preferred and money market
preferred) on which the dividend is reset periodically to reflect
current market conditions and an organization’s current credit
rating. These stocks are excluded from Tier 1 but may be
included in supplemental capital without limit.
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RISK-BASED CAPITAL COMPONENTS
Core Capital
Common stock, at par value
Perpetual preferred stock (preferred stock having no stated maturity date and which may not be redeemed at the option
of the holder)
Surplus (amounts received for perpetual preferred stock and common stock in excess of its par or stated value but
excluding surplus related to limited-life preferred stock, capital contributions, amounts transferred from retained
earnings and adjustments arising from Treasury stock transactions)
Minority interest in consolidated subsidiaries
Retained earnings
Less: Treasury stock (the cost of stock issued by the institution and subsequently acquired, but that has not been
retired or resold)
Goodwill (excess of cost of an acquisition over the net asset value of the identifiable assets and liabilities acquired)
Supplemental  Capital
Limited-life preferred stock including related surplus
Reserve for loan and lease losses
Perpetual debt (unsecured debt not redeemable at the option of the holder prior to maturity, but which may participate
in losses, and on which interest may be deferred)
Mandatory convertible securities (equity commitment and equity contract notes-subordinated debt instruments
maturing in 12 years or less. Holders may not accelerate the payment of principal.
Must be repaid with common or preferred stock or proceeds from the sale of such issues)
Subordinated debt  (with an original maturity  of not less than 5 years)
precise calculation of the ratios is not currently
available. For example, some of the items including
capital components are not currently reported by
banking organizations and a breakdown of risk assets
and off-balance sheet items is not currently available.
Table IV
ESTIMATED RISK-BASED CAPITAL POSITION











Over $15 billion 7.5 7.0 9.5
$5-$15 billion 7.7 7.3 9.8
$1-$5 billion 8.5 10.2 12.0
$500 million-$1 billion 8.0 10.1 11.7
Further, data are not available to calculate the relative
share of first mortgages on 1-4 family properties in
the loan portfolio and there is not enough informa-
tion to measure the percentage of loan commitments
having original maturities exceeding one year.
Likewise, a breakdown of standby letters of credit
by use is unavailable. With these limitations in mind,
the estimates show that all 35 of these organizations
are currently above the 4 percent minimum guideline
for Tier 1 capital and the 8 percent minimum stan-
dard for total capital required by the end of 1992.
Allowance for loan losses The RBC Standard de-
fines general loan loss reserves as charges against
earnings to absorb future losses on loans or leases.
Such reserves are not set aside for specific assets.
Under the RBC guidelines, the general reserve for
loan losses is relegated to supplemental capital, but
no limit is placed on the total general loan loss
reserve. After 1990, however, the reserve is limited
to 1.5 percent of weighted risk assets. After 1992
the reserve may not represent more than 1.25 per-
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major departure from earlier U.S. capital guidelines
in which the reserve for bad debts counted as primary
capital.
When originally proposed, the limitation on the
amount of eligible reserves seemed critical for U. S.
banks, some of which had used the one-time provi-
sion in 1987 in connection with loans to less
developed countries (LDCs) to build up reserves well
in excess of the allowable RBC percentages. Based
on June 30, 1988 data, seven of the 35 Fifth District
companies included in the study would not be able
to fully use their reserve for loan losses. All seven
companies would, however, still be above the pro-
posed final minimum total capital standard of 8 per-
cent. Thus, it appears the limitation may only affect
the large multinational companies,
Treatment  of intangibles  Intangible assets arise
when the stock of a company is acquired for cash.
In a cash transaction, accounting rules require that
the assets of the acquired company be assigned a
market value. In banking, a value is also assigned to
core deposits (demand deposits and interest bear-
ing deposits under $100,000) under the rationale that
these deposits are valuable to the acquiring company.
The values assigned to core deposits and balance
sheet assets are denoted as identifiable intangibles.
The amount paid for a bank in excess of revalued
assets and identifiable intangibles is known as
goodwill.
Goodwill must be deducted from capital in com-
puting the risk-based capital ratio. Identifiable in-
tangibles, however, may or may not require the same
deduction. Different Federal bank regulators will treat
these items in compliance with their respective pro-
posed guidelines.
For bank holding companies, the Fed will exempt
until December 31, 1992, any goodwill existing prior
to March 12, 1988, after which time it must be
deducted from capital. Any goodwill arising from an
acquisition on or after March 12, 1988, will be
deducted from capital immediately. An exception to
this rule may be made for goodwill arising from the
acquisition of a failed or problem bank. At the pres-
ent time, the Fed does not plan to deduct auto-
matically any other intangible assets from the capital
of state member banks or bank holding companies.
5 The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices has agreed to attempt to resolve the question of what
constitutes a general reserve for loan and lease losses. If an agree-
ment can be reached, then general reserves would be included
in Tier 2 without limit. Otherwise, the limitations noted above
will apply.
It will, however, continue to monitor the level and
quality of intangibles, particularly where such in-
tangibles exceed 25 percent of Tier 1 capital.
Term and subordinated debt Under current
guidelines, banks are allowed to count subordinated
debt with an original average maturity of seven years
as secondary capital. Similarly, bank holding com-
panies may include as secondary capital unsecured
term and subordinated debt meeting the same cri-
terion. Under the RBC standard, only subordinated
debt instruments with an original average maturity
of five years may be included as supplemental capital.
While initially there is no limitation on the amount
of such debt that may be included in Tier 2 capital,
after 1992 a limitation applies; instruments includable
in Tier 2 will then be limited to 50 percent of core
capital. According to the RBC standard, all unsecured
term debt issued by bank holding companies prior
to March 12, 1988, and qualifying as secondary
capital at the time of issuance, will be grandfathered
and included in supplemental capital. Bank holding
company term debt issued after that date must be
subordinated to qualify as supplementary capital for
the holding company.
By including subordinated debt in supplemental
capital, the Fed recognizes that subordination does
afford some protection for depositors in the event
of failure. At the same time, subordinated debt of
bank holding companies provides a cushion to senior
creditors, and thus promotes stability in funding
operations. The debt, however, is not permanent;
it must be repaid and is therefore not available to
absorb losses. In recognition of these factors the Fed
established a five-year original maturity requirement
as the minimum period necessary to provide stable
funding. In addition, a five-step amortization schedule
is used to discount subordinated debt and limited-
life preferred stock as they approach maturity.
Application to All banks
The Federal banking regulators have agreed that
the information necessary to calculate capital will be
collected routinely from institutions with assets over
$1 billion. Examiners will monitor the risk-based
capital positions of smaller institutions during on-site
examinations and inspections. Institutions with assets
under $1 billion may be required to report limited
information between examinations, but the plan is
to hold such reporting requirements to a minimum.
Summary
The adoption of an international risk-based capital
standard under the Basle accord reduces some of the
deficiencies in measurement of capital adequacy that
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represents a major step in establishing uniform capital
standards for major international banks. The accord
should contribute to a more stable international bank-
ing system and help reduce competitive inequalities
among international banks stemming from differences
in national supervisory requirements. The applica-
tion of the RBC standard to large Fifth District bank-
ing organizations shows that these organizations
exceed the minimum guidelines that will be required
in 1992. Therefore, it does not appear that Fifth
District banks organizations will be among those who
will need to undertake special efforts to either raise
more capital or shed assets to meet the new stan-
dard. In this regard, however, it should be noted that
the standards are intended as minimums and that
rapidly expanding organizations are expected to stay
above the minimums. A number of Fifth District
bank holding companies have grown rapidly in re-
cent years and a continuation of this growth will
necessitate the generation of new capital. The RBC
standard does not, however, take account of all the
risks to which banking organizations are exposed,
specifically, risks associated with management, li-
quidity, funding, and asset quality. These risks will
continue to be assessed by examiners and will be
taken into account before a final supervisory assess-
ment of an organization’s capital is made. Further,
the Federal Reserve is studying the feasibility of
expanding the standard to address interest rate risk.
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